

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PARIS 02523 01 OF 03 271549Z

46

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AID-05 CEA-01 CIAE-00 COME-00 EB-07

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7222

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 02523

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EEC, FR

SUBJECT: TINDEMANS REPORT - THE FRENCH VIEW

REF: EC BRUSSELS 731

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: FRENCH ARE IN PROCESS OF REVIEWING
TINDEMANS REPORT. FINAL DECISION CONCERNING REPORT'S
SUGGESTIONS WILL BE MADE BY GISCARD. IN THE MEANTIME,
QUAI WORKING LEVEL FINDS PROBLEMS WITH A NUMBER OF
TINDEMANS' PROPOSALS WHICH SEEM TO POINT TOWARD SUPER-
NATIONALISM, BUT ON THE WHOLE QUAI FINDS REPORT A USEFUL
FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINATION OF POSSIBLE AREAS FOR PROGRESS
TOWARD EUROPEAN UNION. END SUMMARY.

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PAGE 02 PARIS 02523 01 OF 03 271549Z

2. IN DISCUSSION WITH POLITICAL COUNSELOR JANUARY 23, ANDREANI (QUAI DIRECTOR FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS) GAVE INITIAL INFORMAL QUAI REACTION TO TINDEMANS REPORT. HE SAID THAT GOF HAS NOT YET ARRIVED AT FORMAL POLICY ON THE REPORT, ALTHOUGH IT IS CURRENTLY UNDER STUDY AT THE QUAI. DECISIONS CONCERNING THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THE REPORT WILL BE MADE BY GISCARD HIMSELF. IN THE MEANTIME, ANDREANI SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO DESCRIBE HIS OWN PERSONAL REACTION TO THE REPORT, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS DID NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT FINAL OUTCOME OF QUAI STUDY OR EVENTUALLY POLICY DECISIONS BY THE PRESIDENT. AS GENERAL COMMENT, HE SAID REPORT WAS USEFUL WORK, AND PROVIDES FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINATION OF POSSIBLE AREAS OF PROGRESS TOWARD EUROPEAN UNION.

3. ECONOMIC ASPECTS: ANDREANI THOUGHT THAT THE "TWO TIER" APPROACH TO ECONOMIC UNIFICATION WITHIN THE EC MADE A GOOD DEAL OF SENSE FROM THE ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW, ALTHOUGH HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS COULD CAUSE POLITICAL PROBLEMS FOR SOME OF THE EC MEMBERS WHO MIGHT FEEL "DISFAVORED" BY SUCH ECONOMIC SEGREGATION. CONCERNING TINDEMANS' TREATMENT OF EC SOCIAL POLICY, ANDREANI SAID THAT THE REPORT'S GENERAL ORIENTATION SEEMED GOOD, BUT THAT ITS GOALS WERE TOO AMBITIOUS FOR THE PRESENT TIME. HE NOTED THAT THE REPORT DID NOT SEEM TO TACKLE IN ANY DETAIL THREE OTHER ECONOMIC QUESTIONS WHICH ARE VERY TOPICAL WITHIN THE EC: CAP, INDUSTRIAL POLICY, ENERGY POLICY.

4. FOREIGN POLICY: ANDREANI SAID THAT THE QUAI IS NOT ATTRACTED TO THE IDEA OF PLACING EC POLITICAL COOPERATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ROME TREATY. THE ROME TREATY CREATES SPECIFIC EC INSTITUTIONS, SPECIFIC MECHANISMS FOR VOTING, AND IN GENERAL TERMS A MORE ORGANIZED APPROACH TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SPECIFIC SUBJECTS TREATED WITHIN THE ROME TREATY. NOWHERE DOES THE ROME TREATY, ACCORDING TO ANDREANI, SUGGEST THAT THIS STYLE OF INSTITUTIONALISM SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO FOREIGN POLICY. IF THE EC WANT TO MERGE THE TREATMENT

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PAGE 03 PARIS 02523 01 OF 03 271549Z

OF FOREIGN POLICY INTO THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TREATY OF ROME, THIS SHOULD BE CLEARLY STATED AND THE APPROPRIATE TREATY MODIFICATIONS SHOULD BE EXAMINED. HE COMMENTED THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE TINDEMANS WAS SEEKING THIS SORT OF REVISION OF THE TREATY OF ROME. HE STRESSED THAT FRANCE WISHES TO KEEP EC CONSIDERATION OF FOREIGN POLICY SEPARATE FROM THE EC STRUCTURE CREATED BY THE TREATY OF ROME. IN ANY EVENT, HE CONTINUED, "IT IS ABSURD" TO

BELIEVE THAT THE EC-NINE WILL HAVE A COMMON FOREIGN
POLICY OVER THE MEDIUM TERM (I.E., FOUR YEARS). NO ONE,
NOT EVEN THE SMALLER EC MEMBERS, WILL ACCEPT EXTENDING
"MAJORITY RULE" TO FOREIGN POLICY. AS A PARTING SHOT,
HE NOTED THAT SEEKING TO EXTEND THE TREATY OF ROME TO
COVER FOREIGN POLICY POSED JURIDICAL PROBLEMS. WHILE
THE TREATY OF ROME FORESEES IN SOME DETAIL A COMPLETE
SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND JURIDICAL RECOURSE FOR THE
ECONOMIC SUBJECTS TREATED IN THE TREATY OF ROME, AN

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PAGE 01 PARIS 02523 02 OF 03 271550Z

46

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AID-05 CEA-01 CIAE-00 COME-00 EB-07

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 PARIS 02523

"APPEAL SYSTEM" DOES NOT NOW EXIST FOR EC-NINE TREATMENT

OF FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. IN THE ABSENCE OF JURIDICAL MECHANISMS FOR FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS, IT SIMPLY MAKES NO SENSE TO TRY TO FORCE FOREIGN POLICY SUBJECTS INTO THE TREATY FRAMEWORK. THE FRENCH MUCH PREFER, CONCLUDED ANDREANI, TO MOVE FORWARD TOWARD COMMON EC FOREIGN POLICIES ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS RATHER THAN ON AN INSTITUTIONALIZED BASIS.

5. SECURITY: ALTHOUGH ANDREANI WOULD NOT BE DRAWN INTO A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE TINDEMANS RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING SECURITY, HE DID SAY THAT IT WAS REASONABLE CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 PARIS 02523 02 OF 03 271550Z

TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS OF SOME SECURITY ISSUES, ALTHOUGH FRANCE WAS NOT READY TO SEE THIS PROCESS GO TOO FAR.

6. US-EC RELATIONS: ANDREANI TOOK STRONG EXCEPTION TO THE TINDEMANS PROPOSAL TO NOMINATE A SINGLE NATION TO REACH A COMMON UNDERSTANDING WITH THE U.S. ON THE "CHARACTER AND SCOPE" OF THE US-EC RELATIONSHIP. THIS WOULD RISK, HE SAID, A RETURN TO THE FRUITLESS DISCUSSION OF THE "YEAR OF EUROPE," AND MIGHT WELL LEAD TO INTERMINABLE NIT-PICKING ON DEFINITIONS OF "CONSULTATION." THE FRENCH WOULD MUCH PREFER TO PROCEED PRAGMATICALLY ALONG THE LINES THAT EXIST TODAY, WHICH THE FRENCH FIND SATISFACTORY. IN ANY EVENT, HE STRESSED THAT HE DID NOT SEE ANY FRENCH WILLINGNESS FOR THE EC-NINE TO SIT DOWN WITH THE U.S. IN A FORUM OF TEN.

7. EC PARLIAMENT: ANDREANI SAID THAT THE REPORT POSED A DELICATE POINT CONCERNING FUTURE POWER OF EC PARLIAMENT: ANY AUGMENTATION IN THE POWER OF THE EC PARLIAMENT COULD ONLY BE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE POWER OF OTHER INSTITUTIONS (E.G., NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS, EUROPEAN COUNCIL). THIS NEED TO TRANSFER POWER FROM EXISTING POWER CENTERS TO THE EC PARLIAMENT WOULD POSE SERIOUS PROBLEMS. ANDREANI CONCLUDED THAT "IT IS NOT CERTAIN THAT THE EC NEED AN AUGMENTATION OF THE POWERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT."

8. EC EXECUTIVE POWER: ANDREANI UNDERLINED WELL-KNOWN FRENCH VIEW THAT FOCAL POINT FOR EXECUTIVE POWER IN EC STRUCTURE INCREASINGLY SHOULD BE THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL (I.E., HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND CHIEFS OF STATE MEETING PERIODICALLY). THE SECOND MOST IMPORTANT EC "EXECUTIVE", IN ANDREANI'S EYES, IS THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. A COMMISSION PRESIDENT NAMED BY THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND CONFIRMED BY THE EC PARLIAMENT POSES FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE CONCERNING WHETHER EC SHOULD DEVELOP AS PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OR AS PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM. ANDREANI

LEFT NO DOUBT THAT FRENCH PREFER PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM
WITH THE "EC EXECUTIVE" (I.E., EUROPEAN COUNCIL) HAVING
A COMPLETELY SEPARATE EXISTENCE FROM THE "EC LEGISLATIVE
BRANCH" AND NOT IN ANY WAY "RESPONSIBLE" TO THE EC PAR-
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PAGE 03 PARIS 02523 02 OF 03 271550Z

LIAMENT.

9. LENGTH OF EC PRESIDENCY: ANDREANI SAID FRENCH HAVE
NO STRONG FEELING ABOUT WHETHER TERM OF EC PRESIDENCY
SHOULD BE LENGTHENED FROM SIX MONTHS TO ONE YEAR. HE
NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH A CHANGE WOULD MEAN THAT THE
CURRENT MEMBERS OF THE EC WOULD HAVE A CRACK AT THE
PRESIDENCY ONLY ONCE EVERY NINE YEARS. SHOULD THE EC
EXPAND TO ELEVEN OR TWELVE MEMBERS, THIS WOULD MEAN
THAT A DOZEN YEARS COULD PASS BETWEEN EACH COUNTRY'S

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PAGE 01 PARIS 02523 03 OF 03 271558Z

46

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 PARIS 02523

OPPORTUNITY TO SERVE AS EC PRESIDENT. ANDREANI CONCLUDED THAT THE PROPOSAL PROBABLY WOULD NOT FLY FOR THIS PRACTICAL POLITICAL REASON.

10. COMMENT: ANDREANI'S COMMENTS BEAR OUT OBSERVATIONS DONDELINGER, SOAMES AND OTHERS HAVE MADE (REFTEL PARA 1) CONCERNING POSSIBILITY THAT TINDEMANS REPORT'S TREATMENT OF US-EC RELATIONS COULD LEAD US BACK TO THE UNCONSTRUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE OF THE 1973-74 DIALOGUE BETWEEN EUROPE AND U.S. SEEN FROM PARIS, SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD RISK UNDOING THE CUSTOMARY SYSTEM OF US-EC POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS THAT HAS EMERGED OVER THE PAST YEAR AND A
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PAGE 02 PARIS 02523 03 OF 03 271558Z

HALF WHILE OFFERING NO REDEEMING ASPECTS. MOREOVER, ANDREANI'S NEGATIVE COMMENT CONCERNING CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE NINE EC POLITICAL DIRECTORS AND AN EQUIVALENT US OFFICIAL SUGGESTS THAT REVIVING THAT PROPOSAL AT THIS TIME WOULD ENCOUNTER DETERMINED FRENCH RESISTANCE. UNLESS STRONG ARGUMENTS CAN BE MADE FOR REOPENING THIS OLD SORE, ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD MAKE A FRONTAL ASSAULT ON THE FRENCH POSITION WORTHWHILE (AND FRANKLY WE DO NOT PERCEIVE SUCH ARGUMENTS AT THIS TIME), WE RECOMMEND THAT THE US AND EC REMAIN WITH THE GYMnich FORMULA -- WHICH HAS SERVED US WELL IN THE PAST. INCIDENTALLY, OUR READING OF THE TONE AND CONTENT OF EMBASSY LUXEMBOURG'S CONSULTATIONS WITH THE EC PRESIDENCY SUGGESTS THAT THIS MECHANISM IS WORKING BETTER NOW THAN EVER BEFORE.
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